US WAR ON TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA

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US WAR ON TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA

* Prof. Dr. Razia Musarrat.

Abstract:

A reading of history gives one the impression that

characteristically the gamut of history is divided into different

phases, of short and long duration. Each of the numerous phases

of history typically starts with the happening of some events of

extra ordinary importance, whose profound implications

dominate the world stage throughout the phase. The

contemporary phase of the history is, beyond doubt, dominated

by the phenomenal war on terrorism. The US-led war on

terrorism which started in 2001 has been the characteristic

feature of the first decade of the new century. Its impact has been

as pervasive as common for all the nations of the world and for

designs of their interaction with one another. South Asia, on

account of a number of factors, has been at the centre stage in

this global fight. As a consequence, it has left overwhelmingly

impact on the different states in this region. This impact has been

not only on the regional dynamics, not only on the bilateral

relations of the South Asian states, but also, most significantly,

on their domestic politics as well. This paper will make an effort

to have a brief assessment of such an impact on all the three

levels.

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*Chairperson Department of Political Science, the Islamia University of Bahawalpur.

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Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The world has experienced it, in different

faces and different demonstration, since ancient times. Particularly, the twentieth century,

which is certainly the most blood-ridden century in human history, saw a persistent

increase and evolution in the terrorist activities. However, it had never enjoyed the status

of being the foremost challenge for the international community. This transformation of

the status of terrorism is obviously the outcome of the attacks of 9/11 on the twin-towers

of World Trade Center and Pentagon- the chief symbols of American economic and

military supremacy. Wounded at the time of its zenith as the sole super power of the

world, America understandably decided to strike back and to launch a global campaign

against terrorism.

It was a very unpleasant decision. What this American resolve to initiate a world

wide war could have implied for the dynamics of international relations could be welljudged

by what President Bush said in his address to the joint session of the US Congress

on September 20, 2001.

"Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and

isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a

lengthy campaign. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them

one against another, and drive them from place to place, until there is

no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or

safe havens to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a

decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the

terrorists."

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It shall be more than clear from this policy statement of the American President

that what America was going to start was not to be a limited military action; rather

America would take the war to the doorstep of every nation in every region. Thus, every

nation and every society had to bear its share of the impact of this global war. Stephen P.

Cohen has said, no part of the world has more affected by the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001 than South Asia.1

Today, if we look back at the five years history of the war on terrorism, it

becomes clear that South Asia had to endure the strain of the consequences of the war.

Perhaps it has been the centre of enormity in this unusual war. There were a number of

factors which made South Asia a central point in the US war. First and prime, the alleged

suspects of these attacks were traced back to the mountainous wilderness of Afghanistan.

The propinquity with a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan brought the war on terror to the

doorstep of South Asia. As we know Pakistan shares border with Afghanistan and was

among the countries which had a formal diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. Secondly,

and more importantly, perhaps, there was no other state in the world that knew the radical

regime of Taliban better than Pakistan. The ample treasure of reliable intelligence, the

ability to launch air strikes from adjoining Pakistani airbases, and the Cold War

confidence in its pledge made Pakistan, and therefore South Asia, a sort of field

headquarters for American military campaign. It may be said that General Pervez

Musharraf calculated that if Pakistan did not cooperate with USA his nation at the very

least would be marginalized and isolated by the US and the international community, at

worst Pakistan itself could be targeted because of its support and relationship with

Taliban

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Thirdly, a deep study of the American foreign policy thinking in the last decade

will reveal that Americans began to develop a feeling of threat from the Islamic

revivalism, after the end of Cold War. South Asia happens to be home to quite a number

of active Islamic revivalist movements. Accordingly, the presence of militant

organizations in South Asia was an open invitation for the American war on terror.

Fourthly, the danger of nuclear terrorism also was a factor for the revival of

American interest in South Asia. In the last decade, a major and drastic challenge to

international security has been the rise of the non-state actors and the stem possibility that

the nuclear weapons may fall to their hands. The presence of strong radical elements in a

nuclear South Asia made this threat highly plausible.

It was for these, besides other reasons, that South Asia was so pervasively

involved in the American war on terror. As the United States prepared to launch its global

war, it put a tough choice before the states of the region "Either you are with us or against

us". It was not only a decisive message but also an indication of the future course of Pak-

USA relations. India, stimulated by the hope of strategic gains offered its all-out support,

in every possible way. Pakistan, given its historic ties with the elements in Afghanistan

was caught in a predicament, for some time, whether to join the war or not. Nevertheless,

when Pakistan was presented the famous list of seven demands, it did not take much but a

call from Colin Powell, for Pakistan to take the bold decision of joining the American

war, unconditionally. Pakistan became an indispensable allay after 9/11 when President

Pervez Musharraf broke with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to join in the US- led war against

terrorism.2

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On January 12, 2002 President Pervez Mushraff said," we have decided to join

international; coalition against terrorism. We took this decision on principles and in our

national interest. He further said Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for any

terrorist activity any where in the world.3 It may be stated that whatever President Pervez

Mushaffraf has done to help the US in its war against terrorism was to avert the grave

consequences of saying ‘no’ to the US. Pakistan’s support was vital for the US because it

not only wanted to use the territory of a country which shares the border with

Afghanistan but also to avert the support which was being given to the Taliban

government by Pakistan. The proactive role of US in South Asia posed challenges for

Pakistan .Pakistan wanted to safeguard its strategic assets, the Kashmir cause and

economic recovery. However there is a sense of dissatisfaction and a belief that the US

and its allies did not live up to the promises and pledges made to Pakistan for its support

in the war against terrorism.4

It may be argued that as far as South Asia is concerned, the post 9/11

development worsened the security environment of the region. The South Asian countries

decided to join the US led war against terrorism because of their own interests.5 India was

prompt in offering its support in the hope that such a configuration of the situation in

South Asia. Pakistan decided to join because of predictable economic incentives, the need

to save its strategic assets and salvaging its Kashmir policy from total destruction.

President Pervez Mushraff acceptance facilitated America‘s military needs of the

moment and led to yet a commitment of aid to Pakistan, has earned the country the title

"key ally".6 But it is imperative to note that America has seen the wisdom of building up

India as counterbalance to China.

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We may agree with Moisi Dominique that thirteen years ago, Samuel Huntington

argued that a "clash of civilizations" was about to dominate world politics, with culture

along with national interests and political ideology, becoming a geo-political fault line

……….. today the world faces what might be called a "clash of emotion" as well. The

western world displays a culture of fear, the Arab and Muslim worlds are trapped in a

culture of humiliation and much of Asia displays a culture of hope.7 Now almost 5 years

have passed and the profound effect of the war is gradually unfolding.

As we have mentioned in the beginning, the impact of the war on the South Asian

region has been particularly at three levels---regional level, at the level of bilateral

relations among regional states and at the domestic level. At the regional level, the

important impact has been the resurgence of South Asia as the region of highest priority

for America. While during the closing decade of Cold War, since 1979, South Asia

remained the highest point in American foreign policy thinking, it lost its prominence

with the Cold War. While the first Clinton Administration wanted to establish a rapport

with India, but South Asia did not figure heavily in American interests. However, the

start of the global war on terror has rediscovered South Asia for America. With the

presence of two nuclear power friends, and an Al-Qaeda-strewn Afghanistan, South Asia

assumed a strategic status in American eyes. The rebirth of South Asia prominence was

not limited to America, rather for whole the world. There was a long chain of Heads of

States, and highest officials visiting the region every alternative day were evidence of

long term strategic interests of the US in the region. The main objective of the US during

the stand off were (1) that the prevailing tension between India and Pakistan should not

escalate into a nuclear exchange (2) that the deteriorating situation should not affect

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Pakistan’s support to the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan. According to Vanni

Cappelli, the Bush administration presented President Pervez Musharraf with an

ultimatum abandon support of Taliban and commit to the American –led war on terror or

face the consequences of being considered an enemy of the US.8 Moins Ahmer says

that," there is no overwhelming strategic framework for South Asia and being against

"terrorism" doesn’t provide one" neglecting both the regions enduring historical relations

and our most pressing current security challenges.9 Resolution of the Kashmir issue was

important for us to maintain good relations with Pakistan and India. It is imperative to

note that the US later played a proactive role in the normalization of deteriorating

Pakistan –India relations. It became the centre of global attention in the global media and

the central battle- ground where the global war was either to be lost or won.

Secondly, the war on terror has had a lasting impact on the regional stability.

There are opposite views in this regard. One viewpoint is that the war on terror has

improved the regional stability. The source of regional instability mainly has been the

irregularly rising tension between the nuclear archrivals---India and Pakistan. The war on

terror and the American military presence is a factor of stability for the region. This has

been fully proved during the 2002 militancy standoff. Following the December 13 attacks

on its parliament, India had pushed the war hysteria up. There was an unprecedented

mobilization of armed forces on a large scale. The armed forces stood eyeball to eyeball

for several days, on both sides of the borders. Even nuclear threats were exchanged. An

outbreak of war was believed to be certain. Then the American military presence entered

as a stabilizing factor. America perceived that a war between India and Pakistan will

certainly subvert, and disrupt its campaign against terror. Its war on terror could only be

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saved by avoiding the outbreak of a regional conflict. So America initiated a wholehearted

effort to defuse the situation. The tension came down. Those who believe that it

was American diplomatic activism which prevented an outbreak of war and nuclear

holocaust believe that the US war on terror is a factor for regional peace and stability.

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On the opposite, a viewpoint upholds that the US war on terror has made the

region highly unstable. There are many aspects of this instability. Firstly, the Taliban had

been successful to restore a kind of stability in Afghanistan for the first time after a very

long period of unrest. America, by dripping to pieces the Taliban regime, once again

pushed Afghanistan into a new phase of insurgency and civil war. This unstable and

troubled situation will not remain confined within the Afghan borders; rather will soon

spread into the neighboring states. We can see for ourselves that the unrest and

turbulence in Afghanistan has leaked out into Pakistan.

The second aspect of war created instability in the region is related to the Indian

effort to manipulate the situation in its favor with full vogour. India equated the selfdetermination

movement in Kashmir with terrorist and accused Pakistan of support and

cross border terrorism. Lal Krishna Advance warned that Bush doctrine could be used

against Pakistan.10 The situation provided an opportunity for India to justify its previous

allegation against Pakistan before the world community. India planned to capitalizes on

the emerging world wide focus against terrorism , which gave New Delhi an opportunity

to portray Pakistan a state sponsoring Jihad and terrorism.11 It may be said that in this

way after 9/11 Pakistan India relations took a new turn when New Delhi offered full

support to the US war against terrorism and tried its best to establish a linkage between

Pakistan support to the Muslim struggle in Jammu and Kashmir and struggling elements

in Afghanistan but India failed to stop Pakistan from joining the US –led coalition against

terrorism. India’s purpose was to discredit the Kashmiris freedom movement and declare

Pakistan as a terrorist state. Consequently Pakistan initiated measure to launch a

crackdown on terrorist elements especially those having connection with Al-Qaeda and

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Taliban. It indicated a change in government’s approach on supporting Kashmiris

freedom struggle. It is imperative to note such measure did not result in de-escalation in

tension between Pakistan and India.

It may be stated that even though Pakistan is, currently the frontline state in the

US war on terror, it is America who is essentially reaping benefits from the situation,

conditions in Indo-Pak hostility, to materialize its own selfish design vis-à-vis the south

Asia region. The Indo-US nuclear deal is a proof of the fact that US has given a military

edge to India making Pakistan more apprehensive than ever as to what real motives of US

friendship with Pakistan. Convinced of American support, India tried to manipulate the

American doctrine of pre-emption to pressurize Pakistan. India had been accusing

Pakistan of waging cross border terrorism in Kashmir. It gambled to justify a possible

attack on Pakistan by borrowing the preemptive doctrine and bringing the Kashmir

insurgency into the realm of US definition of terrorism. The Indian effort to built pressure

on Pakistan on the unjustified pretext of doctrine of pre-emption threatened to destabilize

the region.

The third aspect in which the war on terror generated regional instability is even

more important and sensitive. The chief source of regional instability is the hostility

between India and Pakistan. On the western border, Pakistan always likes to feel secure

through the presence of a friendly regime in Afghanistan. The war on terror has brought

the Northern Alliances to the power in Kabul. The Afghan government is extremely

antagonistic to Pakistan. This has made the western border of Pakistan highly troubled,

thus adding to the regional instability.

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Apart from its impact on the regional environment, the war on terror has largely

influenced the bilateral relations of the countries in the region. The bilateral relations

between India Pakistan, in the last decade of the 20th century remained as tense as ever,

except for the temporary relief of Lahore Declaration. The nuclear tests in May 1998, and

then the kargil crisis in 1999 worsened the relations to the worst levels. However, after

passing through the litmus test of the 2002 military standoff, the ice began to thaw. The

peace process, starting after the friendship offer by Vajpayee on April 18, 2003 marks the

dawn of a new era in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. The composite

dialogue has completed its three rounds. Although, it has not been able as yet to produce

some meaningful progress on any of the major issues with India, nevertheless, the general

normalization of relations and decrease in tension is no mean achievement in itself. It

may be said that the success of composite dialogue could make both countries abandon

wars and cherish peace. The long range of CBMs is accomplishing their objective of

reducing the trust deficit. Resumption of road, rail and air links, exchange visits by the

parliamentarians, media men, and students, the opening up of trade ties, and the growing

people to people diplomacy will ultimately make the task of final resolution of all

disputes including Kashmir, much easier to achieve. One can hardly deny that this peace

process and the CBMs is not inclusively a product of the realization on part of India or

Pakistan, rather the role of third party is of key importance. America, keeping in view the

demands of its war on terror, has been decisive in the initiation and continuation of the

present peace process.

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On the third level, the war on terrorism has had its effects on the domestic

political dynamics of the South Asian states. The impact has been most evident and vital

at the domestic level. It has been either a direct result of the American military activities,

or indirect fallout of the policies adopted by the United States in the region. Perhaps no

other country of the world, except America, has been as deeply affected by the war on

terror as Pakistan.

Pakistan’s geographical location, its nearness with Afghanistan, its close relations

with the Taliban regime, its deep knowledge of the rugged terrain of Afghanistan, and its

history of Cold War alliance made Pakistan obviously the most important strategic asset

for the United States. As Pakistan was chosen to once again fight an American war, it had

to make a number of difficult choices, which changed the course of its history. Pakistan

had to take a U-turn on its Afghan policy by accepting the new regime, both parties

relations could not become cordial just on pretence.12 Pakistan was forced to leave its

longstanding search for the strategic depth in Afghanistan. It made forceful efforts to

convince the Taliban to act in accordance with the demands of international community,

but as the Taliban were insolvent, Pakistan had to withdraw its hand from all kinds of

support to the regime. With this major shift in its Afghan policy, Pakistan lost whatever

influence it had in Afghanistan, Karzai’s government was of the opinion in 2006 that it

was a kind of hidden invasion propped up by outside interference ……. Intended to

tarnish the national identity and historical of Afghanistan.13

For decades it was policy of Pakistan to support and sponsor the militant

organizations in quest of its bleed-India policy. However, the US war on terror forced

Pakistan to rethink its priorities, because America believed that these militant

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organizations formed a pool of terrorists as well as a ready-made basis for its

organizational facilities for the Al-Qaeda network. So, Pakistan at once attacked at the

militant organizations. Some of the organizations like LAT, JEM, TNFJ, SSP, and TNSM

were banned. Their bank accounts were frozen, and their offices were closed.

That Pakistan’s participation in the war on terror has come at a heavy domestic

price is clear from the later tussle between the government and the militants. The militant

organizations were not ready to diaper so easily. They put up a firm resistance, and the

government had to face a severe backlash. Law and order situation go worse. The banned

organizations re-surfaced under new names. The frequency of terrorist activities

multiplied. There was a sharp increase in the suicide attacks on the government officials

and assets. The President himself narrowly get away two suicide attempts at his life.

This backlash has been most alarming in the North West of Pakistan. The North

Western mountainous terrain, the ethnic ties between the Pashtoons on both sides of the

border, and the tribal traditions combinely offered the region as an ideal safe haven for

the Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters running from Afghanistan. The prevailing religious

extremism and the large chain of madarssas spread all over the area welcomed the

fugitives Mujahideen with open arms. As the pressure mounted up on Pakistan to trace

and capture the fleeing terrorists, the government was faced with the difficult choice of

launching a military operation in the tribal region.

The state forces initiated a full-fledge military campaign to drive out the Taliban

scraps in mid-March 2004, when the armed forces came upon an Al-Qaeda shelter at

Kaloosha near WANA, in South Waziristan. Since then, a high tension clash between the

state forces and the foreign militants, along with their local supporters is going on. The

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government had to concentrate as many as 80,000 troops in its effort to bring the troubled

region under control. It was almost impossible terrain despite countless raids siege and

search operations as well as large scale arrests the high value targets were still away from

the iron hands. Thus the military operation failed to deliver required results at the

expense of bloodshed by country men of their brothers. No Al-Qaeda figure of any note

was caught, except their Pakistani supports.14 Few observer have pointed out that Kabul is

not a free agent and that they would not have done all this without the approval of

Americans.15 The terrorist put up a daunting resistance, claiming the lives of above 700

army men.

The indiscriminate shelling on the non-combatants by security forces, have also

caused a large-scale displacement of tribesmen from the violence-hit areas. Hundreds of

families are forced to live with relatives in the neighboring towns. The Government has

alternatively tried various forceful and appeasing strategies. The turbulence originating in

the restless west has penetrated into the far and wide of the country. Major Urban centers

have been targeted by the irritated militants.

Pakistan feels itself unjustly targeted as the pressure from America continues to

go up without reason for doing more. While Pakistan has started its military operation

into the Northern areas at a very heavy domestic price, the Karzai Government in Kabul,

and the aggressive elements in American think tanks continue to show lack of trust on

Pakistan.

Besides the military clashes in the tribal agencies, the war on terror is making its

impact on the more peaceful cities as well. There is a clear cut polarization in the society

on the question of Pakistan’s desirable role in the war. This polarization has further

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deteriorated the perennial challenge of national integration and social cohesiveness in

Pakistan. One school of thought believes that it is a battle that Pakistan is fighting for its

own sake. The militant organizations have become Frankenstein, and turned against their

creator. Therefore, such forces need to be controlled by the government. The opposite

viewpoint upholds that the government is unjustified for lashing at these very

organization which it established by itself. It is, for them, unethical on the part of

government to unleash terror on the Jihadi organizations, by surrendering to the

American pressure. This sharp divide has displayed itself emphatically in public protests

and media opinion.

It needs to be emphasized that while Pakistan is genuinely committed to a war

against all forms of terrorism, the United States is making the task difficult for the

Government of Pakistan, with its unintended actions. The heartless adventures like the

gruesome air strike on the village of Damodola on13th January, 2006 is but only one of

the many examples of the American actions which make it more difficult for the Pakistan

government to justify their stance before the masses. Similarly, the way Karzai

government continues to cast aspersions on Pakistan’s role in restraining the militants

further complicates the situation. It may be said that five years after 9/11, Pakistan’s

Islamist parties are growing stronger; the continuous violence in Kashmir has as far as

Mumbai.

All along this, we must not forget the heavy economic cost that Pakistan is paying

for the war on terror. The adverse situation generated by the war has discouraged the

foreign investors and impeded the domestic economic activity due to political

uncertainty. No doubt Pakistan has been taking substantial financial inflows from outside,

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but this temporary aid and assistance cannot be a substitute for the genuine inflow of

investment, and resulting industrialization of a backward economy.

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One may argue that the political compromise on the constitutional engineering in

Pakistan and the game being played with the democratic ideals is also a result of the war

on terror. Had it not been but for his all out commitment to the American war on terror,

who knows what, would be the American level of tolerance and support for the military

regime of Pervez Musharraf. This is a compromise that the west in general and America

in particular, are willing to make, for the sake of their war on terror.

In this way, the analysis at the various levels---regional, bilateral, and domestic---

makes it sufficiently clear that the war on terror has been a factor of utmost importance in

the political, strategic and military dynamics of the South Asian region. It has left a

lasting impact on the regional strategic environment, on the nature of relationships among

the various states in the region, and on their domestic politics. What we must not forget is

the fact that the war on terror is still not coming to an end. Therefore, its consequences

and implications for the region of South Asia will continue to be gradually known for an

indefinite period of time.

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REFERENCE

1. Stephen P. Cohen, India Emerging Power, The Brooking Institute Press,

Washington D. C., 2002, P. 13.

2. Vanni Cappelli, Containing Pakistan: Engaging The Raja – Mandala in South

Central Asia, Orbis A Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1, Winter 2007,

P. 55.

3. President Musharraf’s Address to the Nation, January 12, 2002.

www.forisb.org/CE-019.htmls.

4. Fazal-ur-Rehman, Pakistan and the War on Terrorism, Strategic Studies,

Islamabad, Vol. XXIII, No. 30, Autumn 2003, P. 58.

5. Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, The Brooking Institute Press,

Washington, 2004, P. 305.

6. Venni Cappelli, op. cit., P. 66.

7. Dominique Moisi, The Clash of Emotions, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86. No. 1,

January/February, 2007, P. 1.

8. Venni Cappelli, op. cit., P. 66.

9. Moonis Ahmar, 9/11 and the Changing Parading of Conflict Resolution,

"IPRI" Journal, Vol. 111, Winter 2003, P. 4.

10. Dawn, April 19, 2003.

11. Brahma Chellancy, "Fighting Terrorism in South Asia", International

Security, Vol. 26, No.3, Winter 2001-2002.

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12. Talat Masood and Agah Murtaza Poya, "The US – Iran Standoff: Options for

Pakistan’s in Policy Perspectives, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, No.

2, Vol. III, July – December, 2006, PP. 11 – 13.

13. New week, New York, October 2, 2006.

14. Maria Madalena L. Carvalho – Fischer and Malthias Fishen, Pakistan Under

Siege: Pakistan After September 11, 2001, Maktaba Press, Lahore, 2004,

P. 39.

15. Dr. Noman Sattar, "War Against Terrorism: Implications for Pakistan" in

National Development and Security, Foundation of Research on International

Environment National Development and Security, Rawalpindi, No. 4, Vol.

XII, (Summer, 2004), PP. 31 – 34.